International Corporate Personhood (Routledge 2021, 2023) tracks the phenomenon of international corporate personhood (ICP) in international law and explores many legal issues raised in its wake. It sketches a theory of the ICP and encourages engagement with its amorphous legal nature through reimagination of international law beyond the State, in service to humanity.

The book offers two primary contributions, one descriptive and one normative. The descriptive section of the book sketches a history of the emergence of the ICP and discusses existing analogical approaches to theorizing the corporation in international law. The normative section presents a theory of the ICP that – unlike existing attempts to place the corporation in international legal theory – does not rely on analogical reasoning. It suggests that ICPs should have ‘passive’ or procedural rights that cater to problems that can be characterized as ‘universal’ but that international law should avoid universalizing ‘active’ or substantive rights which ICPs can shape through agency.

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Accession, Acceptance, and Agreement in International Law (Routledge 2026) shows that State accession to an international legal text is understood differently in different parts of the world and, moreover, that many conventions in the practice of international law are justifiable because of the assumption that accession is agreement.

The dominant understanding of accession as agreement has its roots in European legal traditions, where the notion that a legal text can represent an ascertainable and static “meeting of the minds” underpins the logic of adversarial procedures, declarative judgment, punitive sanctions, and concepts such as necessity. This book shows how the 1955 Bandung Conference articulated a largely neglected vision of accession as acceptance, rather than agreement—one much older than those used at the 1945 San Francisco Conference establishing the UN Charter, one much older than the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights that became a mandatory precondition of modern statehood, and one from which perspective different legal concepts, such as non-intervention and consensus-based dispute settlement, can be derived. Following the Bandungian idea of “accession as acceptance” through subsequent decades of international law, the book chronicles the legacy of the acceptance-agreement disconnect in Third World engagements with international law. The book then argues that the consent as agreement assumption infuses the very process of adversarial judgment—a process almost indivisible from the practice of international law—with a self-sustaining imperial ideology. Finally, the book offers suggestions for procedural reform.

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Legal Personhood and Artificial Intelligence (Ethics Press 2027) reveals that international law lacks a coherent account of what an artificial intelligence system is, legally speaking. The European Parliament flirted with, then abandoned, the language of ‘electronic personhood’. The European Union’s AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) sidesteps the question with a risk-based framework, and in 2025 the Commission withdrew its proposed AI Liability Directive after sustained industry resistance. United States courts and the Copyright Office refuse to recognize AI authorship; the United Kingdom Supreme Court has refused AI inventorship; Saudi Arabia has declared a robot a citizen. A growing body of scholarship proposes ‘fictional’, ‘functional’, ‘limited’, ‘hybrid’, and ‘gradient’ forms of legal personhood for AI. Each of these proposals assumes that legal personhood is a single thing.

This book argues otherwise. Drawing on the Hohfeldian framework developed in the author’s prior work on international corporate personhood, the book argues that legal personhood is a bundle of rights, duties, powers, immunities, and disabilities that can be unbundled and selectively reassigned to AI systems—while keeping ownership, accountability, and ethical responsibility tethered to the natural and corporate persons whose interests are at stake. The central ethical question, the book contends, is not whether AI should be a person, but who owns what about an AI system, and what flows from that ownership. Across training data, model weights, deployment infrastructure, and downstream outputs, ownership is presently being unbundled across jurisdictions in ways that mirror corporate practices: the capture of upside and the diffusion of downside, in patterns that have a recognizable geographic shape.